7 Kant`s view of property described here refers to his thoughts in the Initial Metaphysical Foundations of Legal Doctrine of 1797. In the 1760s, Kant still had a view that had much more in common with Locke`s position. In the observations on the feeling of beauty and sublime of 1764, he developed a theory according to which the conscious will of man justifies private property in relation to work, almost a modified version of Locke`s thought. Kant himself had never published these early reflections on property law and later distanced himself from them. (cf. BRANDT, R.: Eigentumstheorien von Grotius bis Kant. Stuttgart Bad Cannstatt (Frommann-Holzboog). 1974. p. 167 et seq.) Therefore, private property rights are, in principle, a particular form of public property.

To date, there seems to be some certainty as to what constitutes “private property”, but there continues to be enormous confusion regarding the term “common good” and is encouraged by the often inaccurate use of this term. Last but not least, the famous metaphor of the “tragedy of the commons” contributes to this confusion around the term. It therefore seems necessary to analyze this “tragedy” in depth. (www.boell.org/downloads/Lerch_Tragedy.pdf) Costs only arise when something needs to be purchased because it is not available on the network. Ideally, costs should be reduced over time as more and more goods and tools are produced and distributed freely on the Commons network. (www.keimform.de/2008/09/08/hiddinghausen-talks-2-commons-network/) “The distinction between common property and state property is lost to royal libertarians. Common ownership is what we all have inalienable rights to. State property is what the State actually owns and can dispose of as it sees fit.

For example, a public right of way is literally a right of way. According to common law principles, no one, not even the king, could close a busy road and make it private property. A state maintenance car, on the other hand, is a state property that can be sold if it is no longer suitable for the needs of the state. (geolib.pair.com/essays/sullivan.dan/royallib.html) It seems to me that this is an oversight that can and must be corrected. A move of valuable common property must be compensated as well as a move of private property. This compensation could go to the government or to a trust representing all beneficial owners. This would put an end to other strokes of luck for the rich at the expense of everyone else. This would ensure that common resources are used for the common good. One can imagine such trusts protecting common gifts such as the atmosphere, the broadcasting spectrum and terrestrial ecosystems, paying the same dividends to living citizens and supporting renewable energy, public transport, non-commercial broadcasting and other common goods.

As an example of how a common law ownership system works, if a partner buys a boat, car or other vehicle and puts only their name on the title, then that vehicle belongs exclusively to that person. However, if that partner lived in a state that recognized community ownership, the vehicle would automatically become the property of both partners in the marriage. If, on the other hand, the valuable asset is held jointly, there is no such prohibition. A government can take common property and give to private owners without them paying a penny. It is not even necessary that there be “public use” to justify the revenues. Commons (assets that are partially and entirely owned by the community) are still managed by the original shareholders, but they cannot be sold/derivative – if the original shareholders choose to stop maintaining them, they “float” to someone else within the network. In addition to the example of vehicles, other physical assets that could be divided based on common law ownership rules include real estate (such as first and second home homes, rental properties, land, and buildings that are not used for everyday life, such as docks and boathouses). The list also includes valuables such as works of art, antiques and collectibles. Hardt and Roggero`s rejection of “public property” in the name of a “communist project” removes the removal of the term “public” from its hegemonic status as an expression of an abstract collective will/body/thing.

Therefore, the rejection of “public property” in the critique of political economy invites a new political logic that can now be conceived without reference to the political terminology of liberal democracy. “Common” is not only “no property”, but it is also “non-public”; It refers to a collective social form that differs from the “public”* / it does not “replace” the “public”, but transcends it. Such a theoretical intervention allows us to speak a political language that is not structured with the binary opposition imposed by classical liberal and socialist discourses, and thus allows us to imagine another form of “collectivity”. (dx.doi.org/10.1080/08935696.2010.490372) Three other states – Alaska, South Dakota and Tennessee – are opt-in states for community ownership. Whether a state has customary law or a communal property system, the division of property in a divorce can also be determined by a marriage contract or a post-marital contract if the departing couple has one. These natural limits, according to Locke, were eventually overcome by the invention of money and the tacit human consent to attach such value to it.9 Thus, he himself proposed in principle that his justification of the right to natural property was applicable only to a limited extent to most distributional issues in a monetized economy in which capital is accumulated in relation to labor. Locke sees the unequal distribution of property in such a society as the result of people`s “tacit and voluntary consent.”10 Thus, Kant and Locke generally assume that property rights are always a social construct and that private property rights generally require the consent of other members of society. .